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ABSTRACT
This article defends the use of narratives about morally exemplary 
individuals in moral education and appraises the role that ‘nudge’ 
strategies can play in combination with such an appeal to exemplars. 
It presents a general conception of the aims of moral education and 
explains how the proposed combination of both moral strategies 
serves these aims. An important aim of moral education is to make 
the ethical perspective of the subject—the person being educated—
more structured, more salient and therefore more ‘navigable’. This 
article argues why and how moral exemplars and nudge strategies are 
crucial aids in this respect. It gives an empirically grounded account 
of how the emotion of admiration can be triggered most efectively 
by a thoughtful presentation of narratives about moral exemplars. 
It also answers possible objections and concludes that a combined 
appeal to exemplars and nudges provides a neglected but valuable 
resource for moral education.
What role should morally exemplary individuals (or ‘exemplars’) play in moral education? 
In line with virtue ethical approaches to moral education, prominent authors focusing on 
moral character education (e.g., Lickona, 1991; Wynne & Ryan, 1993) have stressed the 
importance of moral role models. Kohlberg (1987) also stressed the value of interacting 
with role models, who embody higher stages of moral reasoning, as a pedagogical method. 
Recently, a number of philosophers (e.g., Kristjánsson, 2006; Zagzebski, 2015, 2017) and 
psychologists (e.g., Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Monin, Sawyer, & Marquez, 2008) have analyzed 
the role that an appeal to moral exemplars can play in this respect. In this article we will 
contribute to this growing ield of study by appraising the role that so-called ‘nudge’ strat-
egies can play in combination with an appeal to exemplars. Can nudge strategies improve 
the efectiveness of the use of moral exemplars in moral education? Or are there legitimate 
moral objections against the use of nudges in this context? Using insights from nudge 
theory, we will defend the use of empirically informed nudge strategies to improve the 
chances of success of educating people morally by appealing to exemplars. In doing so, we 
will defend a view of moral education and moral agency that addresses the concerns of 
nudge theory’s critics.
KEYWORDS
Moral exemplars; nudging; 
admiration; moral navigation
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2   B. ENGELEN ET AL.
Summarily, our view is this: moral education can and should make the ethical perspective 
of the subject—the person being educated—more structured, more salient to his or her irst 
personal perspective and therefore more ‘navigable’. If the generic aim of nudge strategies 
is to structure the subject’s choice context to improve the quality of her choices, then the 
complementary role of moral exemplars is to enhance this ‘navigability’ (Sunstein, 2016, 
p. 44). Just as well-designed roads, cars and GPSs facilitate safe driving through traic, so 
too can moral exemplars help people when they are steering through their morally relevant 
choices. When told well, stories involving moral exemplars can reveal—from the inside—
how they have structured their own choice situations. People we admire prompt us to seek 
to understand them, and their moral choices, from their own points of view. his allows us 
both to understand the role exemplars can play in moral education and to address objections 
to using nudge strategies in moral education.1
Our discussion will proceed as follows. First, we outline what we take to be the two main 
aims of moral education. Next, we analyze the role that moral exemplars can and should 
play in moral education. In the third section, we will explain the basic idea of nudging and 
explain why moral exemplars themselves can be understood as examples of a nudge strategy. 
In the fourth section, we motivate our proposal to use nudge strategies to further enhance 
the educational impact of moral exemplars. Next, we show why our combination of these 
two ‘moral technologies’—with both exemplar stories and nudges serving as techniques to 
make people behave more morally—can meet the aims of moral education that we outlined. 
Finally, we consider the ethical concerns that could be raised against our proposals and 
respond to them.
Two main aims of moral education
Before examining our speciic proposals for achieving the main aims of moral education, 
let us describe what we take to be the two main aims. First, moral education aims to equip 
people with the capacities they need to engage with the ethical deined in the most expan-
sive and least controversial way. Bernard Williams has described this ‘minimal notion’ of 
the ethical as follows:
[It is] the capacity shown, in some form or other, by humans in all cultures to live under rule 
and values and to shape their behavior in some degree to social expectations, in ways that are 
not under surveillance and not directly controlled by threats and rewards. Call this … (the 
minimal version of) living in an ethical system. (Williams, 2002, p. 24)
his minimal notion of the ethical is relatively theory-neutral: all major normative ethical 
theories should be able to agree on it. One aim of moral education is to bring about capac-
ities of people to live under an ethical system in this minimal sense.
However, since talk of capacities is ambivalent between mere capacity possession and 
its excellent exercise, moral education should aim not only to equip people with these 
capacities, but also develop these capacities to functionally adequate levels. he result is that 
people come to observe those everyday norms and rules—against harming others, deception 
and for idelity, truth telling and benevolence—that make a social life in a shared social 
space possible. Any plausible technique in moral education should achieve at least this.2 
his connects to Durkheim’s claim that moral education aims to inculcate morality, a set 
of socially shared precepts demanding speciic kinds of behavior or simply ‘a body of rules 
that govern us’ (Durkheim, 2012, p. 54). Moral education is about enculturation (Wynne 
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JOURNAL OF MORAL EDUCATION  3
& Ryan, 1993) and motivating members of a group to follow that group’s shared normative 
guidelines (Carr, 2008). According to Durkheim, successful moral education fosters disci-
pline (people see what society commands of them) and group attachment (individuals see 
those obligations as desirable, good or ideal).
However, a moral education that causes people only to comply with functionally ade-
quate standards of decency and sociality would be lacking. Prevailing norms and rules 
may be inadequate, or they may change; hence the need for people’s capacities for critical 
distance and relection to be robust and stable. We therefore take the second aim of moral 
education to be the development of this more critical aspect of moral agency. his can be 
spelled out in three ways.
First, morality involves not only the attainment of ordinary standards or norms, but 
also striving towards ideals that transcend the ordinary and recognizing those who come 
closer than most to realizing these ideals (Strawson, 1961). A moral education that ignores 
this would leave its subjects ignorant of an important aspect of morality. Secondly, such 
ideals ofer a distinct source of moral motivation in their own right (Velleman, 2002). 
Moral agents can be motivated by ordinary moral norms, but also by aspiring to achieve 
moral ideals. A moral education that ignores the latter would fail to take advantage of this 
important source of moral motivation. Because adhering to such ideals involves going 
beyond the collectively shared ‘body of rules’, it requires independent thinking about what 
is socially required and expected. hird, moral agents are also equipped with the capacity 
to behave ethically when the surrounding social norms break down, are incorrect, or need 
to be creatively reinterpreted. If people were only educated to conform to existing norms, 
then they would be ill-equipped to handle any of these situations. hese three aspects cor-
respond to what Durkheim (2012, pp. 111–127) calls ‘autonomy’, a third source of moral 
motivation next to discipline and group attachment. hey also it Kohlberg’s view of moral 
education as stimulating people to move towards more critical and independent stages of 
moral development (Kohlberg, 1976).
Each of these more critical aspects of moral agency also characterizes morally exemplary 
individuals. Such exemplars trigger admiration because they exceed ordinary expectations 
in three distinctive ways. First, they outstrip the ordinary demands of morality in the face 
of socially prevailing standards and thereby show the importance of ideals in addition to 
social norms of decency and sociality (see also, Durkheim, 2012, p. 93). Second, they are 
morally creative and give us new insight into the ethical demands of ideals and how they 
can motivate people to do the right thing. hird, they maintain decency in the face of a 
contextual decline of standards. In each case, their morally admirable behavior surpasses the 
average level of moral attainment and reveals the critical distance exemplars have towards 
prevailing social norms, which they transcend or reinterpret when deemed necessary.3 hey 
possess genuine moral and practical wisdom, enabling them to apply ‘the right virtue in the 
right amount in the right way at the right time’ (Narvaez & Bock, 2014, p. 142). Because they 
can inspire other people, they should not be ignored in moral education. But how exactly 
should we appeal to moral exemplars in moral education?
Moral exemplars in moral education
Moral exemplars have a long-standing role in moral education. For example, teachers them-
selves can be positive role models (or can invite such role models to a class) revealing to 
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4   B. ENGELEN ET AL.
students what it means to be a moral person. In his discussion of character building strat-
egies that can be employed in schools, families and so on, homas Lickona (2004, p. 22) 
stresses the need for young people not only to hear and talk about moral values, principles 
and goals but also be exposed to grown-ups ‘who are visibly committed to high ideals and 
engaged in actualizing them more fully’.
Psychologists have long known that moral exemplars can stimulate praiseworthy behav-
ior by others. Perhaps the most intensively studied behavior is altruism, where positive 
role models have been shown to have durable desirable efects (Rushton, 1975). A ield 
experiment conducted by Rushton and Campbell (1977) showed that people who observed 
a positive role model were more likely to donate blood, not only immediately ater the 
exposure, but also in diferent settings six weeks later.
One important way in which being confronted with moral exemplars can turn one into a 
better moral agent is through admiration. A growing body of evidence in social psychology 
suggests that admiration for moral exemplars plays an important role in motivating people 
to act morally. For example, Immordino-Yang and Sylvan (2010) found that participants 
who were exposed to stories about the virtuous acts of others spontaneously mentioned in 
subsequent discussion the desire to be a morally better person and perform noble actions. 
hey therefore called admiration a ‘profoundly motivating’ emotion (Immordino-Yang & 
Sylvan, 2010, p. 110).
his emotional reaction to moral exemplars also has behavioral efects. Both Algoe and 
Haidt (2009) and Schnall, Roper, and Fessle (2010) found a connection between admiration 
and a desire to emulate those being admired. When prompted to report their experiences of 
admiration and asked about the motivational impact of this emotion, participants showed a 
stronger desire to emulate.4 Cox (2010) surveyed a group of American college students on a 
trip to Nicaragua and found that those who experienced morally elevating experiences on 
the trip were signiicantly more likely to engage in volunteering behavior than those who 
did not report such experiences.
Inspired by this empirical work, philosopher Linda Zagzebski (2015, p. 209, 2017) argues 
that a desire to emulate should be viewed as one of the ‘fundamental features’ of admiration. 
Without taking a stand on the conceptual question of whether a desire to emulate is con-
ceptually tied to admiration, we think that the available evidence supporting an empirical 
correlation between the two suices to show why moral education should include an appeal 
to moral exemplars (see also, Croce & Vaccarezza, 2017, pp. 6–7).
We emphasize that a desire to emulate the person being admired should not be under-
stood as a desire to copy her. he latter is oten an inappropriate response to moral exem-
plars, because mature moral agents ought to take into account the diference between their 
own characters and that of the exemplar (Williams, 1995, pp. 189–190). Williams cautioned 
against ‘moral weightliting’: placing oneself in situations that test one’s own character 
traits, potentially to the point of failure, by copying the reasons of one’s ideal moral adviser. 
A morally decent, but unexceptional, person ought to recognize her own relative limita-
tions in comparison to the moral exemplar. Similarly, when moral exemplars advise others 
about how to act, they ought to tailor their advice to it the moral capacities of those others 
(homas, 2006, p. 85; Williams, 1995, p. 190). For this reason, simply copying the actions 
of moral exemplars could be a source of moral error.
Of course, the inappropriateness of simply copying moral exemplars does not imply that 
people do not, in fact, try to copy exemplars to no ill efect: perhaps they just get lucky, or 
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JOURNAL OF MORAL EDUCATION  5
the case is an easy one. Still, there is good reason to think that admiration does not typi-
cally lead to a desire to copy. Investigating the motivational efects of both admiration and 
benign envy (envy that involves a desire to raise oneself to the level of the object of envy), 
Blatz et al. (2016) found that benign envy motivates people to copy the envied person and 
achieve short-term and speciic goals, whereas admiration motivates people to achieve more 
long-term and abstract goals.5 Admiration thus tends to motivate people to emulate the 
achievements of the admired person or moral exemplar in less direct ways.
Nudge strategies in moral education
If narratives featuring moral exemplars can trigger admiration and the desire to emulate 
exemplars, can we use nudge strategies to enhance their efectiveness?6 Before proposing 
some nudge strategies that do exactly that, we irst need to provide an overview of nudge 
theory.
To understand what a nudge is, consider the following deinition by haler and Sunstein 
(2008, p. 6): ‘any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable 
way without forbidding any options or signiicantly changing their economic incentives’. A 
nudge strategy, then, is a deliberate intervention in some choice architecture predictably to 
inluence people’s behavior, without making use of the conventional strategies of coercing, 
sanctioning or incentivizing. his intervention is typically based on empirical evidence from 
psychology and behavioral science about the interaction between choice architectures and 
people’s psychological set-up.
he main proponent of nudge strategies, Cass Sunstein (2014), has a broad conception 
of nudging. Sunstein (2016, pp. 26–27) identiies no less than 13 strategies each of which 
he describes as a ‘nudge’: (1) setting default rules; (2) making information available; (3) 
simplifying complex tasks; (4) speciic information that warns; (5) speciic information 
that reminds; (6) increasing ease of use; (7) personalizing information; (8) framing and 
scheduling choices; (9) rendering options salient; (10) taking advantage of social norms; 
(11) making use of public recognition; (12) moving from nudging to boosting; and (13) 
pre-committed ‘self-binding’.7 he proposals we set out below make use of several of these 
types of nudges, most notably (2), (3), (7), (8), (9) and (10).
On a narrower conception of nudges, they steer people’s behavior not by merely inform-
ing or rationally persuading them, but by tapping into speciic arational psychological 
mechanisms, emotions, cognitive biases and heuristics (Bovens, 2009, p. 208). On this 
account, strategy (2)—and perhaps also (4) and (5)—are not actually nudges. In our view, 
arational and rational mechanisms oten jointly inluence behavior. hink of how people’s 
interpretation of and response to information heavily depends on how it is framed and which 
elements are made salient. If one deliberately uses salience to present speciic information 
in empirically informed ways and thus basically employs strategy (9), this does qualify as a 
nudge, even on the narrower conception. As we will show below, this is exactly what (stories 
about) moral exemplars can and should do.
So why would anyone use nudges? he strongest argument for nudge strategies, that also 
justiies their use in moral education, is what we call the ‘argument from ubiquity’. Every 
choice we make—and every educational setting—takes place within speciic choice archi-
tectures that inluence behavior, whether consciously designed or not (Sunstein, 2016, p. 76; 
haler & Sunstein, 2008, p. 83). If choice architectures are inevitable, why not consciously 
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6   B. ENGELEN ET AL.
design and structure them to bring about better choices? If, in the context of moral educa-
tion, we know that speciic frames are more conducive to moral learning, why not deliber-
ately choose those that most efectively achieve the aims at hand?
Like haler and Sunstein, we believe that the ways in which we structure choice situations 
ought to be informed by scientiic knowledge of people’s psychological—cognitive and 
emotional—features that predictably inluence their choices. Nudge strategies can help 
remedy those situations where people’s psychological set-up predictably leads them astray—
failing to live up to society’s standards and their own professed values and ideals—and more 
reliably achieve the goals of moral education that we set out above.
We will discuss three distinct ways to understand the relation between (stories about) 
moral exemplars and nudge strategies. In the next section we will show that exemplar stories 
themselves can be understood as nudge strategies. In the section that follows, we will show 
how exemplar stories can be enhanced (so as to increase their desired behavioral impact) 
based on nudging strategies. Finally, exemplar stories can reveal how moral exemplars use 
nudge strategies to be better moral persons.
Why exemplar stories are efective nudge strategies
When narratives embedding moral exemplars are used in moral education, as they oten are8 
morally relevant considerations are framed in ways that highlight their salience. Instead of 
abstractly presenting moral principles, ideals or theories, exemplar stories refer to concrete 
others who in speciic situations had the courage to do what was right and even go beyond the 
call of duty. Rosa Parks’ deiance of segregation law and the discriminatory practices of her time 
provides a vivid and impactful way to illustrate the moral importance of equality. his is more 
efective than providing general statistics, for example, about the number of people sufering 
under such discriminatory practices. Moral exemplars are typically embedded in narrative struc-
tures whereby certain features of the choice situation are highlighted and others rendered less 
salient. As such, exemplar stories are already nudges. hey employ at least the following nudge 
strategies from Sunstein’s list: (2) making information available; (7) personalizing information; 
(8) framing (moral) choices; and (9) rendering options salient.
Which psychological mechanisms do exemplar stories exploit? he behavioral efect that 
results from narrating exemplar stories—emulating exemplars—is not achieved merely by 
informing subjects about some historical event or explaining the reasons behind the moral 
exemplar’s actions. Instead, it is the focus on a single, salient case that enables exemplar 
stories to trigger emotional responses that motivate action. hey exploit the ‘availability 
heuristic’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973): more immediate, recent and vivid information 
comes to mind with greater ease and has a larger behavioral inluence than less immediate, 
recent and vivid information. By making use of salience and emotion, exemplar stories 
thus predictably generate desirable outcomes more efectively than the mere provision of 
abstract information and arguments.
One might object to using framing efects and triggering emotions to inluence how 
people respond to exemplar stories. Some ethical theorists, notably consequentialists, are 
unhappy with what they take to be unhelpful contingencies of our psychological makeup 
that make morally irrelevant features seem salient when they are not. (hat is, when their 
relevance is judged from a consequentialist perspective.) hink of Peter Singer’s (1972, 
p. 232) concerns about the role that distance can play in moral judgement. In Singer’s famous 
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JOURNAL OF MORAL EDUCATION  7
example, we can easily be motivated to our duty of immediate rescue when we see a toddler 
who has fallen into a pond in close proximity. But what explains our failure to respond in 
the same way to the fate of distant strangers? Singer implies that psychologically irrelevant 
factors such as ‘distance’ intrude here. While we agree that distance is irrelevant if it is no 
obstacle to urgent action, the issue is not about spatial distance, but about knowledge and 
variation in its degree of concreteness and abstraction.
More detailed, concretized knowledge aids altruism while less detailed, more abstract 
knowledge impedes it. We do not view this as a potential obstacle to ethical aims, but as a 
point to be exploited at the service of them. he key issue is how morally relevant knowledge 
is framed. An appeal to exemplars, embedded in a narrative, frames this knowledge such 
that it can be appreciated ‘from the inside’. It gives the person being educated insight into 
how the moral exemplar found certain features of a morally problematic situation salient 
such that their actions seemed, from their perspective, ethically mandatory. It is not that 
exemplars do not face conlict or struggle. However, the depth of their moral understand-
ing is such that they bring the correct resources to bear on the problem to hand. With the 
salient features conceptualized, the action that is called for appears to them as something 
they were obligated to do. Even when they perform heroic acts, they feel they are simply 
doing the right thing (Archer & Ridge, 2015).
So, while framing efects in themselves may not be morally relevant, we argue they can 
stimulate subjects of moral education to see things through the eyes of a concrete other and 
rethink (the relevant norms, ideals and duties in) the situation at hand. Admiration—the 
emotion triggered by exemplar stories—does exactly this: it makes people focus on long 
term goals and thus expand and transcend their oten all too narrow focus (Blatz et al., 
unpublished).
Improving the use of exemplar stories through nudge strategies
Given what we now know about the psychological mechanisms that trigger (moral) behav-
ior, we will describe in this section how an empirically informed use of nudge strategies 
enhances the efectiveness of exemplar stories. We distinguish between two sets of nudge 
strategies that can enhance the use of moral exemplars: the irst relies on more general 
psychological insights about what drives moral behavior, the second focuses speciically 
on the role of admiration.
Creating more afective stories
First, psychologists have long known that ‘without afect, information lacks meaning and 
won’t be used in judgment and decision making’ (Slovic, 2007). Afect has a largely automatic 
and unrelective impact on behavior and can be elicited by visual images, but also by using 
speciic words, sounds and memories to trigger people’s imaginations. How people react 
to a speciic case (a crime with a victim or an exemplary act with a beneiciary) depends 
more on how they intuitively feel about it than how they reason abstractly about it (Haidt, 
2001). Stories that play into this fact are thus likely to generate a more signiicant emotional 
response, which in turn generates a more signiicant tendency to act.
Empathy, sympathy, compassion, sadness, pity and distress—all of which can be triggered 
through a vivid representation of beneiciaries—have each been shown to be powerful 
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8   B. ENGELEN ET AL.
motivations for helping behavior (Batson, Ahmad, & Lishner, 2011). Narratives about the 
sufering of concrete others, and the heroic acts of exemplars in response, engage people in 
ways that abstract principles or mere facts do not. Vivid language and a detailed picture of 
the circumstances trigger emotional responses and bring about desirable behavioral efects.
Consider the inding that people donate more to charity ater having been presented with 
concrete examples about recipients with whom they can easily empathize as opposed to the 
same cases presented via abstract igures and statistics (Behavioural Insights Team, n.d., 
p. 9). his enhanced emotional involvement has been labeled the ‘identiiable victim efect’ 
and has received both laboratory and ield conirmation (Small & Loewenstein, 2003). By 
contrast, using abstract and impersonal data creates less emotional involvement and even 
‘psychic numbing’ (Slovic, 2007). When constructing narratives about moral exemplars, 
one should thus focus not only on the moral exemplar, but also on her beneiciary. One can, 
for example, present Oskar Schindler’s heroic story by focusing on the number of Jews he 
managed to rescue in World War II (over 1200) or by focusing on the efect of his actions 
on an actual family that was saved. he latter frame will elicit more afect and hence serve 
as a nudge strategy that elicits more inspiration.
Why does making exemplar stories more afective also render them more efective? 
First, afect triggers interest. We are interested in things that trigger our emotions and vice 
versa: emotions are more intense for important topics (Frijda, 1988). Second, afect—in 
its more speciic form of emotion—also triggers speciic motivations (Frijda, 1988). hird, 
events that are afectively laden are remembered better at a later time (Hamann, 2001). If 
an exemplar story triggers more afect, it is thus more likely to be remembered at a later 
time and in another situation.
Creating more relatable stories
he second set of nudge strategies one can use to enhance exemplar stories relates to the 
inding that these stories should be told so that people can relate to them.9 One challenge 
is to understand how exemplars, who generally perform exceptional deeds in extreme 
circumstances, can come to motivate people to perform less exceptional deeds in quite 
ordinary circumstances.
In fact, authors have argued that ‘close-by’ exemplars (in terms of one’s everyday expe-
rience) are more likely to trigger admiration and the desire to emulate than more ‘distant’ 
saints who ‘might look too far away from our ordinary experience and hence appear to be 
less imitable’ (Croce & Vaccarezza, 2017, p. 13). Croce and Vaccarezza (2017) argue that 
heroes, who display one or two virtues to an exceptional degree, are more ‘imitable’ than 
saints, who are lawless without qualiication (see also, Zagzebski, 2017, chapter 3).
Because, as we have seen, imitating is oten not the appropriate response to exemplars, 
we argue that relatability is what matters. When moral exemplars turn out to have laws or 
at least idiosyncrasies, experience moments of weakness and are revealed to be human, they 
are more relatable than the all too perfect, godlike and out-of-reach creatures that populate 
hagiographies. Quite like abstract statistics, stories about the unambiguously virtuous will 
not be likely to get under people’s skin, have them think, help them avoid moral errors and 
spur them into doing good.
Moral exemplars can be ‘close’ or ‘distant’ in both a psychological sense (similarity in 
terms of personality and character traits) and a physical sense (being among our relatives, 
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acquaintances or friends) (Croce & Vaccarezza, 2017, p. 17). Levinson (2012) argues that 
role models from our neighborhood, church, or family can actually inspire by virtue of their 
‘ordinariness’ rather than their greatness.
Still, even when characters are distant, physically speaking, well-told stories can produce 
changes in the brain (increasing oxytocin levels) correlated with moral behavior. In his 
studies, Zak (2015) combines evidence about people’s physiological responses to stories with 
surveys and post-narrative behavior (such as donating money to a related cause). Stories 
are found to motivate prosocial behavior, when they succeed in generating attention and 
emotional resonance (see above), making people care about the characters and drawing 
you into the story (narrative immersion). In short, the more relatable exemplar stories are, 
the more they will succeed in promoting moral behavior.
Triggering admiration
he third set of nudge strategies that can be used to enhance the use of exemplar stories 
relates to the growing body of evidence that such narratives elicit admiration and thereby 
foster the desire to emulate the exemplars. How should narratives be framed so as to induce 
most admiration?
To trigger the most admiration, it is useful to look at its antecedents: admiration arises 
from the perception that someone exceeds a standard (Algoe & Haidt, 2009). In the case of 
moral exemplars, focusing on the many things that someone did that went over and above 
the call of duty will trigger more admiration. Interestingly, the same idea about making a 
story more afectively laden (providing concrete details) can help in achieving this result. A 
story about Nelson Mandela can focus on his abstract accomplishments, or on his personal 
struggles and the hurdles he had to surmount. hese details can help show that many of his 
actions went far beyond the call of duty, providing examples of a person exceeding standards.
On the other hand, framing can also produce counter-productive results depending on 
the audience at hand. Consider moral rebels who do not comply with prevailing ethical 
norms that are, in fact, defective. While a disengaged third person reacts to the moral rebel 
with ‘admiration and respect’ (Monin et al., 2008, p. 76), those who were involved in the 
same situation but who complied with the defective norms have a diferent response. hey 
reported negative emotions and resented rather than admired the rebels (Monin et al., 
2008). his inding mirrors one of the indings in Stanley Milgram’s famous (1965) studies 
on obedience. While those who read these studies applauded the participants who refused 
to cooperate in administering electric shocks to the victims, those who had administered 
such shocks responded negatively to these rebels in debrieing. According to Monin et al. 
(2008, p. 87), this reaction may arise from people viewing the acts of the rebels as an implicit 
rejection of their behavior, which threatens their self-conidence.
Minson and Monin (2012) provide further evidence for this claim in studies investi-
gating the reactions of meat-eaters to vegetarians. A signiicant proportion of respondents 
reacted with ‘do-gooder derogation’ (putting down others who represented themselves as 
more morally insightful than other people). his was even more likely when they expected 
vegetarians to view themselves as superior to meat eaters or when they imagined the veg-
etarians’ moral judgment of meat eaters. Crucially, the negative reaction seems to stem 
from feeling threatened by more ‘morally’ motivated people. his reaction is independent 
of the truth about whether or not eating meat is a moral issue or whether vegetarians do, in 
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10   B. ENGELEN ET AL.
fact, view themselves as morally superior to meat eaters. What matters is the feeling that a 
person is being judged by others as lacking an appreciation of the ‘correct’ moral standards. 
Whether exemplars succeed in triggering admiration thus depends strongly on how they 
are presented to the audience.
Similar evidence can be found in the reactions of privileged teenagers to hearing Peter 
Singer’s (1972) arguments in support of the claim that privileged people should donate large 
amounts of their incomes to charities that assist the global poor. As Seider (2009, p. 230) 
shows, rather than increasing support for these charities, these arguments made the students 
less empathetic to the plight of the global poor than they had been at the start of the class.
hese three studies all suggest that exemplar stories do not trigger admiration in these 
cases. In fact, they have a negative efect on moral motivation when people feel their moral 
self-image is threatened by the behavior of people who are presented as morally conde-
scending towards them. One way of utilizing this inding for moral education would be 
to construct narratives about moral exemplars carefully and ensure that people are only 
presented with stories where the behavior of the exemplar cannot be interpreted as an 
implicit criticism of their own behavior.
Another possibility is suggested by the inding that when the non-rebels engaged in a 
self-airmation exercise prior to reading the rebel story, they no longer responded negatively 
to it. Before being presented with a story, they were asked to recall a recent experience in 
which they had ‘demonstrated an important quality or value’ (Monin et al., 2008, p. 86). 
his group did not respond negatively to the rebels and in fact declared them especially 
moral (Monin et al., 2008, p. 86). Asking people to engage in a self-airmation exercise 
prior to reading stories of moral exemplars thus enhances the intended educational efect 
of exemplar stories.
he way in which exemplar stories are presented thus impacts their motivational results. 
Another example of this lies in the inding that role models were more likely to be moti-
vationally inspiring when they were viewed as both relevant (the role model is judged to 
be similar to the participant) and attainable (the participant believes she too could achieve 
what the role model has achieved) (Lockwood & Kunda, 1997). While this study focused 
on non-moral role modeling, Han (2016) found the same results hold for moral exemplars. 
his provides us with another way in which we can inluence the motivational power of 
exemplar stories. If educators ensure that exemplar stories are relevant and attainable then 
they are more likely to have the desired motivational results.10
Moral exemplars, nudge strategies and the aims of moral education
In this section, we explain how the above proposals can contribute to the realization of both 
aims of moral education, as previously outlined: (1) enabling people to uphold society’s 
norms and standards; while (2) developing people’s critical and creative capacities.
First aim: enabling people to uphold norms
With respect to the irst aim, combining insights from nudge theory and the use of moral 
exemplars can increase the chances of people meeting the basic standards of decency and 
sociality in their society. Even when they have internalized these standards, people may fail 
to conform to them due to the force of psychological mechanisms such as akrasia, laziness 
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or the tendency to conform. While we all know, for example, that we should help people 
in need, we oten ind ourselves not even upholding this minimal standard. hink of the 
‘bystander efect’ where people are less likely to ofer any help to a victim when others are 
present. How can our proposed nudge strategies help here?
Moral exemplars can serve as reminders—Sunstein’s nudge strategy (5)—about what 
morality demands. Stories about moral exemplars who exceed social norms and expecta-
tions can remind people of those very norms and motivate them to uphold them. hink of 
how students react when hearing the story of teacher Ray Coe, who decided to donate his 
kidney to one of his pupils, Alya Ahmed Ali. Instead of immediately donating their kidneys 
as well, they will typically be inspired to perform less exceptional but still praiseworthy acts 
of kindness. In general then, nudges can be said to provide vivid cues that can help people 
bridge the gap between ‘knowing what to do’ and ‘actually doing it’. As shown before, the 
more afectively narrated moral exemplars are more likely to be remembered (when con-
fronted with a moral dilemma that resembles the narrative) and therefore more likely to 
remind people about what morality demands and motivate them to act accordingly.
In addition, moral exemplars can serve as an ‘anchor’ that effectively raises the bar 
for doing good. If we hear about people donating half of their income to charities and 
about the concrete beneficiaries of their altruism, giving away 5% suddenly seems 
much more doable. Singer explicitly hopes to change social norms—Sunstein’s nudge 
strategy (10)—about giving behavior by providing more exposure to good examples. 
Instead of keeping acts of altruism secret, bringing them out in the open and recogniz-
ing their admirable character—Sunstein’s nudge strategy (11) of making use of public 
recognition—Singer (2015, p. 9) hopes to create a culture more conducive to giving. 
Once that is in place, one can expect people’s tendency to conform to others to play a 
role in motivating them to adhere to social norms.
Nudge strategies can also reduce the cognitive costs of practical decision-making by 
‘routinizing’ many ethical choices. he good life surely does not consist in facing constant 
ethical challenges and struggling with problematic ethical dilemmas on a daily or even 
hourly basis. None of us can control our fate and whether or not one inds oneself in morally 
unlucky contexts. Constitutive and circumstantial bad luck aside, virtuous people try so to 
structure both the contexts in which they ind themselves and their routine decision-making 
to increase the likelihood of sound ethical decision-making. While moral education should 
equip us with the skills necessary for making hard and even tragic choices, it should also be 
based on the idea that the moral path oten runs quite smoothly, without too many obsta-
cles. In fact, it reveals the third claim we want to make about the tight connection between 
moral exemplars and nudge strategies, namely that moral exemplars typically use (self-)
nudge strategies to facilitate their moral decisions and be better moral persons.
In this respect, we agree with both R. Jay Wallace (2001) and Susan Wolf (2007) that 
ethicists have neglected the ‘minor virtue’ of ‘cleverness’. his refers to an agent’s capacity 
eiciently to realize her ends. Cleverness certainly does not suice for virtue, but it is nec-
essary for it. Since this domain of the clever is focused on the efective realization of one’s 
ends (whatever these may be), it lends itself to being reinforced by nudge strategies. Since 
mere cleverness can also help the immoral to reach her goals, it is particularly important to 
set aspects of the choice architecture—such as defaults, information and salience—in ways 
that reinforce those goals that any agent ought to endorse: namely those of the everyday 
norms of the minimally ethical. Given our commitment to these norms, we do our best to 
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12   B. ENGELEN ET AL.
follow the lead of moral exemplars who design their choice environments in such a way 
that adherence is easy and temptation (to break these norms or let go of their commitment) 
avoided.
Second aim: enabling people to break, bend and exceed norms
With respect to the second aim of moral education, societal norms of decency and sociality 
might need to be critically challenged. Moral education should enable people’s capacities to 
criticize and even break norms (or creatively bend them) in certain circumstances. If one 
has the bad moral luck to ind oneself in an occupied country during the Second World 
War, the general deterioration of norms may make it hard to uphold the minimal norm 
of idelity to one’s neighbors (since this would require risky behavior). A white Christian 
priest in the US during the Civil Rights era might want to make the diicult decision to 
participate in Martin Luther King’s march at Selma. hese acts of courage can be inculcated 
by using moral exemplars positively to frame how such exemplars may well have exceeded 
expectations, but still felt they had no choice but do exactly that.
In practice, nudge-enhanced exemplar stories typically achieve both aims at the same 
time. Because much reasoning in ethics—as in everyday practice—is threatened by the 
informational complexity that might bear on decisions (homas, 2011, pp. 159–160), the 
key point is that nudge strategies reduce cognitive costs (Sunstein, 2016, p. 61). Our strategy 
of combining moral exemplars and nudge strategies thus consists of: (1) using nudge theory 
so to structure choice situations as to make good decision-making less costly; thereby (2) 
freeing up resources for critically challenging existing norms.
When aiming to educate someone into the minimally ethical, we believe the path to morality 
ought to be designed to be the path of least (cognitive) efort. Virtues and intentions themselves 
can function as planned pre-commitment strategies, at least on the understanding that they are 
not necessarily situationally robust without reinforcement. To achieve this robustness, individuals 
and societies should pay more attention to how to manage choice contexts. Interestingly, one 
hallmark of the virtuous is exactly that they are careful not to place themselves in situations that 
impede or inhibit their capacity for virtue (Goldie, 2004, chapters 3 and 4). In short, they make 
use of the nudge strategy of (3) simplifying complex tasks.
here are two ways in which nudges—and thus also nudge-enhanced stories—can 
increase the relectiveness that is key to moral education’s second aim to know when it is 
right to break the norms. he irst is indirect. Most nudges facilitate people’s choices by 
tapping into more automatic and less relective cognitive processes. However, by doing so, 
they reduce cognitive efort and free up people’s limited ‘mental bandwidth’ (Mullainathan 
& Shair, 2013). A well-told story, like a well-designed piece of equipment (think of a smart-
phone’s interface), intuitively reveals its purpose and how to deal with it. Instead of making 
you ponder on irrelevancies, they allow you to focus and relect on what really matters. 
Second, nudges can trigger attention and relection on what matters more directly as well. 
When people get distracted, face small obstacles and are lazy or weak-willed, nudges can 
help them get back on track. Like reminders that pop up when you are wasting too much 
time online in the oice, so too can exemplar stories prompt you to rethink your priorities.
In both cases, the combination of exemplar stories and nudges helps people (re)orient 
and (re)conceptualize their ethical demands. Research shows that exemplar stories trigger 
a desire to become a better person (self-improvement) by eliciting admiration, which is 
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not only energizing in generating a desire to emulate but also makes people relect and 
deliberate (Onu, Kessler, & Smith, 2016). In addition, exemplar stories can trigger elevation 
(‘admiration for virtue’, which produces a desire to be virtuous) and inspiration (which 
encourages to reconsider and set new goals) (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Immordino-Yang & 
Sylvan, 2010; hrash & Elliot, 2003).
In sum, the two moral technologies—moral exemplars and nudge strategies—are more 
than complementary; they are convergent and mutually reinforcing. While nudges towards 
the minimally ethical target cleverness, we accept that practical reasoning not merely con-
cerns how to achieve one’s pre-given ends (means-ends reasoning) but also the choice of 
one’s ends. his may involve ‘constitutive reasoning’: set yourself a goal (of having a pleasant 
evening, for example), imagine some constitutive solutions to that problem, and be moti-
vated accordingly (Wiggins, 2000). his kind of reasoning is not merely instrumental and 
its results can be indeterminate because one’s capacity for imagination is so important to 
it. Because it draws upon the capacity imaginatively to rehearse solutions to problems, it is 
important in appreciating the role that moral exemplars can play in moral education. Our 
two strategies, then, are mutually reinforcing.
Ethical concerns about nudge strategies
While the use of moral exemplars is uncontroversial, our endorsement of nudge strategies 
in moral education may give rise to concerns. he more general nudge literature, ater all, 
is replete with objections. In what follows, we outline these objections and show why they 
do not apply to our proposals.
First, there is a concern about the direction into which people should be nudged 
(Hausman & Welch, 2010). An ot-heard criticism is that nudge strategies are objectionably 
paternalistic (Grüne-Yanof, 2012; Sunstein, 2016). When others steer your behavior into 
a speciic direction, they are imposing their goals and values upon you, which is putatively 
illegitimate in a liberal society. In our view, this does not pose a serious challenge to our 
proposals, because we have explicitly limited ourselves to nudges as moral strategies geared 
at the two aims of moral education set out above. To the extent that you endorse these, 
there is no reason to be particularly worried about the direction of the nudge strategies 
proposed here.
Second, there is a persistent concern about the techniques involved in nudges that critics 
call both manipulative and a threat to people’s rationality and autonomy (Bovens, 2009; 
Grüne-Yanof, 2012; Hausman & Welch, 2010). Subjects who are nudged supposedly act for 
the wrong reason or even no reason at all. heir actions are not spurred by their relective 
judgements or reasons, but by the combination of largely automatic, unrelective psycho-
logical mechanisms (such as salience or some emotional response) and irrelevant tweaks 
in choice settings.11
A third and related concern questions whether nudges can be moral technologies. he 
concern is that nudge-based action cannot be genuinely moral action. Unless one is a 
full-blooded consequentialist, the intentions and reasons behind actions matter, morally 
speaking. What moral education should be striving for is not to generate speciic behavioral 
efects—which is the primary aim of nudge strategies—but stimulating people to perform 
the right actions for the right reasons. he actions that nudges, heuristics and biases generate 
can thus not be genuinely moral.
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14   B. ENGELEN ET AL.
In response to the second and third objection, both of which center around the supposed 
inadequacy of nudges as moral strategies, we have three replies.
First, we appeal once again to the ‘argument from ubiquity’. Since stories about moral 
exemplars have to be told in some way, framing efects will inevitably have an impact. If this 
is the case, what exactly would be gained, in terms of moral quality of action, if we set aside 
nudge strategies altogether? People will still be inluenced by a combination of the irrelevant 
characteristics of their choice architectures, the stories they are told and their psychological 
set-up. So, unless one wants to drop exemplar stories in moral education altogether, why 
not frame them so that they predictably steer behavior in desirable directions?
Second, what exactly is less moral about deliberately telling an exemplar story so as to 
maximize the impact they are meant to have anyway? Our focus here has been on how 
nudges can help trigger moral emotions such as admiration that undoubtedly constitute 
good reasons for the actions motivated by them. here is nothing ‘irrational’, ‘heteronomous’ 
or ‘less moral’ about acting out of admiration or elevation, even if these are triggered by 
speciic ways of framing exemplar stories.
his is not a compromise with the psychological irrelevancies of our human condition 
that impede the demands of the good—as some consequentialists imply. Taking advantage 
of our psychological setup allows moral education to frame situations in ways that make 
ethical decisions more accurate and more robust. On our account of moral agency, the 
nudge strategies we have proposed can indeed be called ‘moral technologies’. he admiration 
they trigger does not lead to quasi-automatic copying but can make people reconceptualize 
situations and rethink their long-term goals and ideals.
hird, as we have stressed, nudge-enhanced exemplar stories can actually induce people 
to focus relectively on ethical demands, either directly by prompting ethical relection or 
indirectly by making everyday decisions less cognitively demanding and thereby freeing up 
cognitive space for more demanding choices. Successful moral education facilitates ‘moral 
navigation’: it places subjects in a position to navigate their way through ethical choices, both 
simple and complex. his image of ‘moral navigation’ suggests that much of ethical thinking 
is taken up by the correct conceptualization of the choice situation. A correct framing of 
the issue takes the moral subject close to the correct answer—if the issue of deliberation 
arises at all. Well-designed choice situations, then, qualitatively improve ethical decisions. 
Nudges form part of a wider set of self-management strategies for agents who have their 
own characteristic limitations.
If nudge strategies increase the ‘navigability’ of our ethical landscapes and help agents 
with this metaphorical ‘mapping’, then what is the role of moral exemplars? Are they ‘bea-
cons’ or landmarks on the landscape by which the moral agent orientates herself? We think 
that metaphor is unhelpful because we do not think that the role of exemplars in moral 
education is to provide clear-cut directions for subjects to follow. Exemplars do not function 
as examples that agents can simply copy. As foci of moral attention, they do motivate us to 
try and understand their motivations from their own points of view.
Contrast two kinds of imagining: acentral and central imagining. If you imagine Martin 
Luther King on the bridge at Selma you can represent to yourself an imagined scene contain-
ing King (acentral) or you can imagine the scene from the point of view of King—centered 
on you, the imaginer (central) (Wollheim, 1974). In our view, narratives that nudge people 
towards better moral decisions should invoke central imagining: seeing ethical choices as 
framed from the perspective of morally exemplary people themselves.
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his also helps to address perhaps the main concern about exemplar stories in moral edu-
cation, namely that they impose excessive ethical demands that are actually de-motivating. 
Morally exemplary people exhibit the feature of moral depth (Archer & Ridge, 2015) and 
oten experience acting virtuously as practically necessary for them—an expression of their 
moral character (Archer, 2015). he imaginative attempt to see things from their points of 
view is not, however, as we have stressed, mere imitation: the ethically less deep cannot and 
should not simply copy those with a deeper understanding. Nevertheless, they can come to 
appreciate how a person’s character is expressive of her moral outlook such that some kinds 
of actions might be practically necessary for the exemplar but beyond the reach of the less 
exemplary.
In fact, we believe that morally exemplary people exhibit two sets of ‘meta-virtues’ that 
enable them to succeed in: (1) managing the situations in which they ind themselves; and 
(2) relectively managing their cognitive resources (Goldie, 2004). It is a hallmark of moral 
exemplars that they manage the situations in which he or she inds themselves—so far as 
circumstances permit. Speciic decisions, in particular situations, may be inluenced by the 
person’s overall conception of what is worthwhile not merely in this situation, but across 
situations (Wolf, 2007).
Conclusion
Over the last few decades, moral education research has moved away from a predominantly 
cognitive approach to an emphasis on character formation and virtue embodiment (Carr, 
2008; Revel & Arthur, 2007). In line with this evolution, we have stressed the role played 
by moral emotions such as admiration in moral education. We have referred to empirical 
insights from psychologists to inform the academic discussion of moral education and 
propose new ways to translate theoretical insights about moral agency and education into 
practice—a translation that is oten lacking (Revel & Arthur, 2007). Speciically, we have 
demonstrated that, as moral educators inevitably present information in some way to those 
they seek to educate, they should do so in ways that most efectively realize the two overall 
goals of moral education.
In short, we have suggested a twofold strategy that appeals both to moral exemplars and 
nudge strategies, but in diferent ways. First, the admiration that moral exemplars instill can 
motivate people to respect the everyday norms of the minimally ethical, which is further 
supported by nudge strategies that make the minor virtue of ‘cleverness’ more efective 
and less cognitively costly. Second, people can be nudged towards the critical dimension 
of moral thinking and agency by using narratives that embed the central imagining of 
what it is to emulate a morally exemplary person. In our view, this combination of nudge 
strategies and exemplar stories provides a fruitful and promising way of achieving both 
aims of moral education.
Notes
1.  Moral education can obviously be targeted at individuals at diferent levels of cognitive, 
emotional and moral development. Obviously, we are not claiming here that moral exemplars 
and the admiration they can trigger are the only or always the most appropriate pedagogical 
methods in moral education. It goes without saying that diferent strategies are more suitable 
for toddlers for example.
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16   B. ENGELEN ET AL.
2.  Williams’s use of a ‘minimal’ conception of the ethical implies that at least this is, 
uncontroversially, identiiable as an ethical system. hat is independent of the claim about 
the extent to which people inculcated into any such system live up to its demands. he latter 
has to represent a psychological commitment that is, on any reasonable understanding, more 
than ‘minimal’. Living under the ethical is always an achievement even if that achievement 
varies by degree. Hence our further point that a moral education must bring all citizens up 
to functionally adequate standards.
3.  While this characterization of moral exemplars may seem somewhat arbitrary, we believe 
it its both conceptual work on moral exemplars and common sense. For example, the 23 
moral exemplars with diverse backgrounds and goals, whose stories are told by psychologists 
Colby and Damon (1992), are all characterized by their exemplary moral reasoning and how 
committed they live out their moral convictions and principles, even if it implies standing up 
to or rectifying injustices. Lickona (2004, p. 21) summarizes the ive criteria used by Colby 
and Damon to identify moral exemplars as follows: ‘(1) a sustained commitment to moral 
ideals; (2) a consistency between one’s ideals and means to achieving them; (3) a willingness 
to sacriice self-interest; (4) a capacity to inspire others; and (5) a humility about one’s own 
importance’.
4.  Algoe and Haidt (2009) distinguish between elevation (roughly moral admiration) and 
admiration (all other forms) and treat these separately. his does not impact on the point we 
are making here, as both were found to be connected to a desire to emulate.
5.  For a justiication of the distinction between benign and malicious forms of envy, see [van 
de Ven (2016)].
6.  To avoid repeating the cumbersome phrase ‘narratives embedding moral exemplars’ or ‘stories 
featuring moral exemplars’ we will abbreviate this for convenience to ‘exemplar stories’.
7.  In our view, this expansive list can certainly be made more parsimonious: for example, items 
(4), (5), (7) and (9) might all be folded into (2). Of course, diferent strategies can be combined: 
pre-commitment works well in combination with social norms, for example. Sunstein calls 
this ‘mixing and matching’.
8.  Of course, exemplar stories can serve other purposes, such as historical accuracy, besides 
being used as an educational strategy. In this respect, they difer from other nudges, whose 
sole purpose is to change people’s behavior. Within an educational setting though, exemplar 
stories are generally used for this latter purpose. Oten, this happens quite loosely in the hope 
that these stories trigger admiration, inspiration and subsequently, moral behavior. Amongst 
the more systematic approaches are the method of ‘Other-Study’, where the teacher presents 
an exemplar, selected for example from an online repository such as Virtue in Action (www.
virtueinaction.org) and then asks students to relect on the exemplar’s strengths of character, 
the obstacles she had to overcome, etc. (Davidson, Lickona, & Khmelkov, 2014, pp. 302–303). 
Lee (2014, p. 338) mentions exemplar stories as one of the ive methods for moral character 
education used in Korea, adding that teachers can reconigure those stories and the ways in 
which they are presented on the basis of the content, the class’s starting point and the desired 
goals. Our aim here is to draw on nudge theory to understand more speciically how to present 
these exemplar stories so as to generate genuine moral action and serve the main aims of 
moral education. Damon and Colby (2015, p. xvi) even develop an ‘exemplar methodology’, 
in which case studies of moral exemplars are analyzed in light of the ‘profound and moving 
insights into moral commitment that can be uniquely valuable for the rest of us’.
9.  We thank an anonymous referee of this journal for pressing us to develop this point further.
10.  Peter Singer himself seems to have understood this message. Instead of relying exclusively 
on abstract moral arguments and hypothetical thought experiments, he uses more and more 
concrete examples of how donating to charity can alleviate the plight of the poor. His most 
recent book (Singer, 2015) is full of examples of how people have come to donate substantial 
parts of their incomes. Each of these stories is set up with care so as not to invoke guilt trips 
and try to persuade you, the reader, that helping others is not merely good for them but also 
good for you.
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11.  Like an anonymous referee of this journal rightly pointed out, critics could argue that nudge 
strategies may undermine people’s relective capacities in the longer run, incentivizing people 
to think less for themselves and rely more on others and the environment to guide them. 
We know of no empirical evidence in support of this claim. Also, remember the ‘argument 
from ubiquity’: even in the absence of intentional nudges will people be inluenced by less 
relective processes and small aspects of the choice architecture.
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